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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SCHOLASTIC POLITICS 
America was settled long after the church had ceased to be a 
primary factor in the emerging power politics of the modern era. 
Mortmain and the dissolution of the monasteries in England broke its 
independent economic base. The national church establishment replaced 
the vision of Christendom. Many functions of the church were absorbed 
by the state. Poor relief was one of these and the Elizabethan poor law 
was meant to fill a recent void. In due course, education was similarly 
taken up by the state. Luther's Germany and Calvin's Geneva initiated 
systems of universal public education. They served the double purpose 
of creating an educated citizenry and reproducing the Protestant 
character of the Reformation. 
Massachusetts followed suit. 
A century later, the Puritans of 
The jurisdictional rivalry between church, state, and family is 
today nowhere more evident than in education. Each claims a distinct 
purpose and interest in the instruction of its members, citizens, and 
heirs. At times, each has been loath to recognize a higher interest or 
authority than its own. Yet nowhere is there a greater community of 
interest than in education. It originated amidst the early cooperation 
between church and state. Its purposes were equally republican and 
Christian. The dissension that accompanied the transition from 
common schools to a system of public schools exemplifies the growing 
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religious and political strains that preceded the Civil War and 
continued for some time afterward. By its nature, education is a 
constitutional issue of the first magnitude. 
The Public Education Movement 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which anticipated the Constitution 
in many details, paid special attention to religious liberty and the 
encouragement of education in the opening words of its third article: 
"Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government 
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall 
1 forever be encouraged." But there was nothing new about this official 
interest in public education. The Pilgrims and Puritans of colonial New 
England also held education in very high regard. In the estimation of 
Moses Coit Tyler: 
The proportion of learned men among them in those early days was 
extraordinary. It is probable that between the years 1630 and 1690 
there were in New England as many graduates of Cambridge and Oxford 
as could be found in any population of similar size in the 
mother-country .... Only six years after John Winthrop's arrival 
in Salem harbor the people of Massachusetts took from their own 
treasury the funds with which to found a university; so that while 
the tree-stumps were as yet scarcely weather-browned in their 
earliest harvest-fields, and before the night howl of the wolf had 
ceased from the outskirts of their villages, they had made 
arrangements by which even in that wilderness their young men could 
at once enter upon the study of Ar~stotle and Thucydides, of Horace 
and Tacitus, and the Hebrew Bible. 
By 1649, public instruction had been made compulsory throughout New 
England except in Rhode Island. In fact, the modern ideal of an 
educated citizenry had emerged only a century earlier under similar 
circumstances in western Europe. Ellwood Cubberley attributed its 
original impetus to the Reformation: 
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Under the new theory of individual responsibility promulgated by 
the Protestants the education of all became a vital 
necessity .... The modern elementary vernacular school ... may 
be said to be essentially a product of the Protestant Reformation. 
This is true in a special sense among those peop1es which embraced 
some form of the Lutheran or Calvinistic faiths. 
Just as the English chancellor--a clergyman--had formerly been keeper of 
the king's conscience, the university served this function in Lutheran 
Germany, which indicated the high level of public respect for its 
.. t 4 
mlnlS ry. But state control of the new primary school was rejected at 
first, even though the reformers were dependent on state or municipal 
5 
authorities to compel school attendance. Only much later did state 
school systems develop, first in Prussia and then in France, during the 
Enlightenment and following the French Revolution. Voluntary, 
church-supported school systems prevailed until 1870 in England, where 
6 
separate Anglican and Nonconformist schools operated freely. 
The tradition of limited government in America may help account for 
the public ambivalence toward public schools throughout the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth century. Many supporters of tax-supported public 
education enlisted the same arguments that long had been used to justify 
tax support for the "public Protestant teacher of piety, religion, and 
morality" and compulsory attendance upon his instruction. They 
recognized in the new state systems of public education a ready 
instrument for encouraging religion and morality as well as knowledge 
among those who lived outside the direct influence of the churches. 7 
Stephen Colwell counseled the Protestant churches of his day to set 
aside their sectarian rivalries: 
No denominational jealousy is exhibited among Protestants when men 
read the Bible without a clerical expositor at their side; neither 
can they feel any when it is read to, or by the children, in the 
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public school; nor when its contents are explained without any view 
to those special theologica~ distinctions which mark the lines of 
separation betwen Churches. 
Opponents, on the other hand, emphasized the dangers of political 
and religious tyranny. The Presbyterian theologian, Archibald Alexander 
Hodge, warned of its secularizing effects: 
It is capable of exact demonstration that if every party in the 
State has the right of excluding from the public schools whatever 
he does not believe to be true, then he who believes most must give 
way to him that believes absolutely nothing, no matter how small a 
minority the atheists or agnostics may be. It is self-evident that 
on this scheme, if it is consistently and persistently carried out 
in all parts of the country, _the United States system of national 
popular education will be the most efficient and wide instrum9nt 
for the propagation of Atheism which the world has ever seen. 
In England, John Stuart Mill expressed a comparable concern: 
The objections which are urged with reason against State education, 
do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to 
the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a 
totally different thing. . . . A general State education is a mere 
contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and 
as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the 
predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a 
priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing 
generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it 
establishes a despotire over the mind, leading by natural tendency 
to one over the body. 
But the motives that guided both sides in the controversy were many 
and varied. In the frontier settlements, the chief supporters and 
leaders of public education were often ministers. As David Tyack has 
suggested: "There the issue of church and state may more profitably be 
examined in terms of clerical influence rather than sectarian 
11 
control." 
The prevailing view of the struggle over public schools is still 
largely the one provided by Horace Mann and virtually graven into stone 
by Ellwood Cubberley. David Tyack noted in 1966 that most textbooks in 
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American educational history followed the latter's "use of Massachusetts 
and New York as paradigm cases of church-state relations in the 
nineteenth century" and observed: 
The role of ministers in the common school awakening is far less 
clear and familiar than their work in founding colleges. Indeed, 
through many accounts of the public school movement in 
mid-nineteenth-century America runs a strain of anti-clericalism, 
as if Horace Mann, fresh from his squabbles with the orthodox 
clergy in Massachusetts, were dictating the text. As a result, 
ministers have not won recognition for their contribution to public 
education, nor has the Protestant coloration of the common school 
been examined sufficiently. One reason for this neglect is that 
most of the early studies were "house histories," stories written 
by school administrators or by education profesors who chose to 
disregard ministers because they were outside the profession of 
teaching, strangers at best and mischievous meddlers at worst. An 
essential part of the creed of these early educational historians 
was that schooling should be secular, public in support and 
control, and managed by professionals. It was axiomatic to them 
that secularization meant progress, Samuel Eliot Morison has 
written, and that "schools inspired by the r~irit of religion, or 
conducted by ecclesiastics, are worthless." 
But current educational history is no longer so closely wedded to the 
orthodoxy of an earlier generation of educators. 
Some public education advocates regarded compulsory school 
attendance as the linchpin in their efforts to assert professional 
control over the tax-supported schools. Massachusetts led the way with 
the first compulsory school attendance law in 1852. 13 Cubberley himself 
noted the dual purpose: 
Everywhere the right of the State to compel communities to maintain 
not only the old common school, but special types of schools and 
advanced training, has been asserted and sustained by the courts. 
Conversely, the corollary to this assertion of authority, the right 
of the State to compel children to partake of the educational 
advanta~4s provided, has also been asserted and sustained by the 
courts. 
When taken individually, tax support of schools and compulsory 
school attendance laws do not necessarily create the conditions or the 
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attitudes that tend to be associated with monopolies. But taken 
together, they do little to discourage the natural tendency by the state 
to favor public schools, sometimes to the point of impeding the 
operation of private schools. The financial impediments acknowledged by 
Justices Jackson and Rutledge are only part of the story. Although 
early attempts to shut down private and parochial schools were thwarted 
by the courts or failed in the legislatures, some states today have 
lately sought to enforce detailed regulations that tend to dilute the 
differences between public and private schools. Recent and continuing 
efforts by several states to close unaccredited church schools and home 
schools are perhaps best understood in light of an educational 
monopoly. 
This monopoly issue is one of fundamental constitutional 
significance. Through the cooperation of all levels of government, the 
civil state has become ultimately responsible for financing public 
schools, regulating them through grants-in-aid programs, setting 
curriculum standards, compelling attendance, licensing or otherwise 
regulating nonpublic schools, accrediting teachers, and establishing 
teachers colleges. In addition, the historical record lends ample 
support to the suspicion that many of those who initially lobbied for 
public schools and universities sought to promote or reinforce rising or 
reigning orthodoxies. Like so many public education advocates, Thomas 
Jefferson drew on the language of religion when describing his vision of 
the future for which such--in this case, the University of 
Virginia--were to serve as midwives: 
It is in our seminary that the vestal flame is to be kept alive; 
from thence it is to spread anew over our own and the sister 
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States. If we are true and vigilant in our trust, within a dozen 
or twenty years a majority of our town legislature will be from one 
school, and many disciples will have carried its doctrine home with 
them tg their several states, and will have leavened the whole 
mass. 
What these words suggest is the very sort of molding of opinion 
that John Stuart Mill found so disturbing a power to vest in the state. 
The imposition or maintenance of an ideological orthodoxy is rarely 
avowed as a goal by public education advocates, yet it has been 
indirectly suggested in a variety of ways. Horace Mann, for example, 
regarded public education as a means of shaping character and reforming 
behavior: "Let the Common School be expanded to its capabilities, let it 
be worked with the efficiency of which it is susceptible, and 
nine-tenths of the crimes in the penal code would become 
obsolete .. "16 Mann was criticized by the Association of Boston 
Masters for promoting radical ideas, like the infant school system, 
phrenology, and an equal ratio of teachers to students. 17 
In very similar terms, James G. Carter commended the establishment 
of institutions for the education of teachers: "An institution for this 
purpose would become by its influence on society, and particularly on 
the young, an engine to sway the public sentiment, the public morals, 
and the public religion, more powerful than any other in the possession 
18 
of government." Carter equated the state--as sovereign--and the 
government when he wrote that the teachers' college "should be 
emphatically the State's institution .... If it be not undertaken by 
the public and for public purposes, it will be undertaken by individuals 
for private purposes. 111 9 
It is perhaps this potential for imposing an ideological orthodoxy 
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that aroused the strongest opposition and posed the greatest danger to 
constitutional limitations. The founders were guided by a belief that 
governmental power must be restrained because it tends naturally toward 
tyranny. Later, in remarks that dealt specifically with the Sixteenth 
Amendment, John W. Burgess formulated a test for the constitutionality 
of governmental powers based on this philosophy of limited government: 
What is genuine constitutional Government? It is not simply a 
Government based on a written document, without regard to whence 
that document came and what it provides. Genuine constitutional 
Government rests upon two fundamental principles, principles 
without which, whatever else it may be, it is not genuine 
constitutional Government. These two principles are, first, that 
it must be representative Government and, second, that it must be 
limited Government. That is, first, there must be back of 
government a more ultimate authority, which decrees the 
organization of the Government, vests it with powers, and imposes 
upon it limitations. This body or organization we denominate in 
political science the sovereign. Now, in genuine constitutional 
Government this body must not govern. If this body should govern, 
such Government would necessarily be absolute and unlimited, since, 
as the original and most ultimate authority in the order of 
authorities, there would be nothing back of it which could control 
or restrain it. 
But this is not yet enough for the establishment of genuine 
constitutional Government must be representative Government, but 
representative Government can exist without being genuine 
constitutional Government. Let us suppose, for example, that there 
exists in a given political system a sovereign power organized back 
of, separate from, and supreme over the Government, but that it 
should vest all of its own power without exception or limitation in 
the Government, or all of its power in regard to certain most 
important subjects in the Government, such a Government would be 
representative, but it would not be constitutional in any true and 
genuine sense of the word. It would be an absolute Government, in 
whole or part, no matter how benevolently disposed. In order to be 
constitutional it must be subject to limitations imposed upon it by 
the sovereign in behalf of the Rights and Immunities of the 
individual. Constitutional law is a body of limitations on 
governmental power and you dare not call any document a 
Constitution, no matter from what source it may come, which is not 
such. It would not solve, in the slightest degree, the great 
problem of political history and political science, the 
reconciliation of Government wit20Liberty. It would simply 
sacrifice Liberty to Government. 
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Religion and Education 
The thesis that public education is an establishment of religion or 
an attempt to create a new consensus is not a new idea by any means. 
Supporters and opponents were equally impressed with the religious and 
moral influence of public schools. Horace Mann often extolled the 
virtues of teaching the Bible as a means of inculcating Christian 
21 
morals. His conservative critics did not object to instruction in the 
Bible so much as derogate the kind of "non-sectarianism" that was 
taught. As David Tyack pointed out, they "feared that he was smuggling 
Unitarianism into the curriculum."22 
A major factor in the original success of the public education 
movement was the perceived need to channel the waves of new immigrants 
into the mainstream of American life. An overriding purpose of public 
education, then, was assimilation into a particular cultural value 
23 
system. This still appears to be the guiding purpose with respect to 
unassimilated ethnic groups. But assimilation must be directed by means 
of a set of commonly accepted norms. These norms, in turn, derive from 
religious sources, however much educators may attempt to detach them 
from their dogmatic roots. Religious diversity has made it impolitic 
for public schools to favor explicitly denominational standards. But 
critics from a variety of religious viewpoints often have little 
difficulty in recognizing the religious presuppositions--particularly 
those they find objectionable--that infuse everything from curriculum 
. t t t h. t h . 24 requlremen s o eac lng ec nlques. 
Nineteenth-century Catholics criticized the public school system 
for attempting to detach their children from the Catholic faith. 
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Immigrant groups in general and Catholics in particular were suspected 
of cherishing alegiances to foreign sovereigns. Indeed, Catholic 
schools were typically held in official disregard. One leading citizen 
of Boston was quoted as saying that "the only way to elevate the foreign 
population was to make Protestants of their children." 25 Michael Katz's 
comments on the attitudes of public school officials make the 
controversy sound as contemporary as the furor over fundamentalist 
Christian schools and home school programs. 
In their report for 1854 the school committee complained that the 
parochial schools (they termed them "Romanist") had undermined 
educational planning. Catholic children were leaving and 
re-entering school at such an erratic pace that no enrollment 
predictions could be made. Even more serious, the very children 
"emanating from a class of our population so destitute of domestic 
advantages, as to make them special candidates for all the benefits 
of our school system" had been removed from the influence of 
excellent tea2gers and facilities and placed in decidedly inferior 
institutions. 
But in the eyes of many Catholic families the religious bias of 
public education was everywhere to be seen. That same year, the Supreme 
Court of Maine upheld in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854), the 
expulsion of Bridget Donahoe from a public school in Ellsworth for 
refusing to join in reading the King James version of the Bible. 27 
State courts normally upheld mandatory Bible reading--whether in the 
King James or the Douay version or both--on the grounds that "the Bible 
is not a sectarian book." 28 It is thus evident that whether or not 
public schools ever represented an establishment of religion in the 
constitutional sense, they played a very similar role at one time and, 
like Sunday closing laws, may even yet be structured according to the 
assumptions of the establishment tradition even though they are 
outwardly secular. 
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Secularization was originally offered as the solution to 
sectarianism in the classroom. Its application to public education 
significantly anticipated the desegregation policies of more recent 
times. Alexander Bickel recognized a continuity of purpose between 
Americanization and later desegregation programs: "Performance of the 
assimilationist function required government-owned and 
government-managed schools, the presence in the classroom of children of 
all nationalities, religions, and classes, and the de-emphasis of 
factors like religion, which divided rather than united the children."29 
The pattern or policy of pluralism in public education makes particular 
sense if seen in comparison with the ancient Roman strategy of breaking 
down parochial exclusivism and forging a new standard for unity by 
appearing to embrace all competing loyalties. 30 Although the ideal of 
universal religions may be well described by the motto e pluribus unum, 
the biblical religions honor doctrinal truth over ecumenical unity. 
Instead of agreeing that "all roads lead to Rome," a Christian school is 
apt to reply that "strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which 
leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it" (Matt. 7:14). The 
differences of attitude are profound. Each view is exclusive in its own 
way and certainly exclusive of the other. Alexander Bickel quoted 
Justice William Brennan's opinion in the Schempp case as an illustration 
of the secularist rationale: 
"· .. the American experiment in free public education" has 
evolved to the point where the schools now "serve a uniquely public 
function: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free 
of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort--an 
atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to 
all American groups and religions." 
The mission of the public school so conceived would have required 
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not only compulso31 free public education, but exclusive free 
public education. 
Such exclusivism was clearly the object sought by Wisconsin, 
Nebraska, Iowa, and Oregon when they attempted to restrict private 
32 
education or, in the case of Oregon, abolish it altogether. But the 
Court's Pierce decision of 1925 did not end such political interference 
with private education. Regulation--or subsidization--is a far more 
effective mechanism for control than prohibition. While the Court ruled 
out the destruction of private education as a legitimate means of 
ensuring educational conformity, it did not refute the logic of the 
position these states took. Felix Frankfurter, who welcomed the Court's 
rulings in the Meyer, Pierce, and Bartels cases, later wrote the 
majority opinion in the Gobitis case and dissented when this compulsory 
33 flag salute ruling was reversed three years later. It is only to be 
expected that public and private schools will operate somewhat at 
cross-purposes if there are meaningful differences between them. The 
secular purpose of public education is assimilation to a common 
pluralism. Its primary effect is to avoid and even downgrade what is 
considered parochial, divisive, or separatist, as Justice Brennan's 
k . h" s h . . t . d" t 34 remar s ln lS c empp oplnlon appear o ln lCa e. Short of an 
exclusive and universal free public education, the next best means at 
the state's disposal is to set detailed curriculum, accreditation, and 
testing standards. 
Regarded in this light, the Supreme Court's series of decisions 
concerning aid to church-affiliated schools assumes a different 
character. Even its accommodationist rulings make eminent sense in view 
of this secular purpose of consensus-building. In the Everson case, the 
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Court upheld aid to the parents of school children in the form of 
reimbursement for public transportation costs. In the Wolman case, it 
approved the loan of textbooks to individual students, the supplying of 
state-mandated standardized tests and scoring services, the provision of 
speech and hearing diagnostic services as well as specialized remedial, 
therapetic, and guidance services by school board employees. More 
recently, the Court upheld a Minnesota law granting state income tax 
deductions for private school tuition in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 
3062 (1983), a matter that promises further litigation in the future. 
Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority in this five to four 
decision, maintained that the only source of entanglement was the 
requirement that officials determine whether particular textbooks 
qualify for the deduction. Justice Marshall, who wrote for the 
dissenters, agreed that the deduction did not completely subsidize the 
religious schools. But he noted that under the Nyquist rule no 
subsidization is permissible unless it is restricted to the purely 
secular functions of a school. 
These decisions were not outwardly designed to advance the cause of 
religious free exercise and the Court treated the religious issue as a 
minor consideration in the framework of a legitimate secular purpose. 
As Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in the Wolman case: "Providing 
diagnostic services on the nonpublic school premises will not create an 
impermissible risk of fostering ideological views; hence there is no 
need for excessive surveillance and there will not be impermissible 
church-state entanglement'' (433 U.S. 229, 230). Religion was weighed in 
the balances and found wanting. 
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But some critics contend that a strictly secular purpose is no more 
neutral with respect to religion than a clearly religious or 
antireligious bias. Whatever else may be said about it, David Martin, 
James Hitchcock, Harvey Cox, and other students of the subject have 
shown that secularization--and even secularism as a philosophy of 
life--is an outgrowth, a reflection, and in part a rejection of biblical 
religion. 35 
Two issues that have frequently been raised are, first, whether 
state-mandated curriculum standards and teacher certification 
requirements inhibit the free exercise of religion and, second, whether 
such regulations serve as vehicles for an establishment of religion. 
John Whitehead and John Conlan, for example, have insisted that changes 
in judicial doctrine are in effect establishing a religion of secular 
humanism: 
Judicial relativism deposits "raw power" in the hands of State 
institutions and, in particular, the courts. "In these 
circumstances the order of society and the established human rights 
are in no way protected against arbitrary power, and there is no 
reason why the discernment of right and wrong should not be given 
over to an all-powerful State charged with making its own 
criteria." The chance of an imposed order becoming a reality in 
the modern technological State is imminent. The tide of 
totalitarianism can be stemmed by recovering the dignity of Man 
based in the creature-Creator relationship. Moreover, to prevent 
an imposed State order, Secular Humanism must be finally recognized 
as a religious ideology and its unconstitutional e~~ablishment 
within our governmental organs must be prohibited. 
Paul Toscano echoes these complaints from a different religious 
perspective: 
... the Court not only forbids government from aiding theism, but 
it also implies, in the name of religious neutrality, that 
traditional, theistic religion should not exert any influence on 
government or on government institutions (including public 
schools), thus relegating traditional religious beliefs and 
convictions to an inferior status in the political arena. By so 
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doing, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a trend toward the 
establishment of national secularism, a trend that raises many 
troublesome questions. Should strongly held beliefs, especially 
with regard to education and curriculum, be restrained simply 
because the majority feels such beliefs are religious? 37f so, how 
can religious beliefs be avoided in American education? 
John Remington Graham, on the other hand, believes that critics who 
single out this epicurean tradition for attack miss the point. He has 
emphasizes that educators should not be "condemned for attempting to 
teach children how to think in moral terms. No education would be 
sufficient, or even possible, without instruction concerning what ought 
to be, as well as what is." Graham suggests that, given the broad 
definition of religion, the religious nature of education be 
acknowledged and that government support of education be maintained "so 
long as religious neutrality is observed." 38 
This brings the controversy back full circle and raises the 
question whether there exist any religiously neutral values or norms by 
which schoolchildren may--and should--be socialized and educated. This 
question may be posed even more directly in terms of the the three 
criteria of the Supreme Court's establishment clause test: a secular 
purpose, a neutral primary effect, and the absence of an excessive 
entanglement with religion. Can state regulation of expressly religious 
schools--through licensure, accreditation, or teacher 
certification--pass muster under this three-pronged test and, if so, to 
what extent? The same question may be asked about state financing of 
expressly non-religious schools in which free religious expression is 
unwelcome or views are taught that contradict religious doctrines. 39 
Finally, does the Supreme Court's own establishment clause test even 
pass its own test of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion? If the 
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problem is primarily one of definition, then it might be further asked 
whether there is a single definition of religion that will allow all of 
these questions to be answered in the affirmative. 
Writing shortly after the Seeger decision of 1965, Marc Galanter 
described what he called the "new latitudinarianism:" 
In the process of avoiding the constitutional question, the Court 
has broadened its notion of religion to include all beliefs which 
are sincere, meaningful, and paramount in the lives of their 
holders. Thus the theistic element of the earlier view of religion 
is supplanted, and with it the application of any "objective" 
criterion of the boundaries of religion is rendered extremely 
difficult. There now remains no valid test of the content of a 
claimed religious belief--neither its truth, good sense, 
comprehensibility, theism, or its acceptance by an organized group. 
Courts may, at the most, apply general tests of psychic 
function--or, ween dealing with institutions, of institutional form 
and functions. 
This confounding of the boundaries between sacred and profane things 
further suggests that the institutional forms and functions of the 
modern state, which are derived from a tradition of hierarchical 
religion, incorporate one realm as much as the other. 
Conduits of Regulation 
The public education movement was a natural response to a genuine 
need created by the industrial revolution and it still bears the imprint 
of its origins. But the electronics revolution of recent years promises 
to gradually undercut the centralizing tendencies that resulted in the 
great "paleotechnic" institutions, as Lewis Mumford has called them, 
including factories, great bureaucracies, penitentiaries, standing 
41 
armies, and centralized educational systems. The growing interest in 
home education, for instance, is well-supported by the new 
communications technology at a time when the possibilities for 
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sophisticated educational experimentation as well as parental 
dissatisfaction and taxpayer resentment over current policies have 
perhaps never been greater. New options are coming within financial 
reach for less affluent families. Current school financing practices 
are likely to eventually give way to alternative methods that reflect 
the growing decentralization of education and correspond with the 
decentralization of work. 
Given the pressing financial, educational, and discipline problems 
of schools in general, however, there is likely to be much resistance to 
alternative systems that may further tax the capacities of established 
public school systems. The present system of school financing contains 
built-in incentives to reduce competition and limits programs to a 
fairly narrow range of selection. Enriched programs are often 
criticized for elitism and for that reason are particularly vulnerable 
to budget cuts. But an educational system that seeks primarily to 
reflect its community and reproduce a harmonious statistical bell is 
unlikely to appeal to families with different aspirations, who would 
likely turn elsewhere given the opportunity. 
Many families with children in private religious schools are 
dependent on the availability of aid. But whether for grade school or 
college, the government has become the major supplier or guarantor of 
school aid. Such assistance, however, carries the hazard of entangling 
recipient schools in the strings that are normally attached to 
government grants. Several private colleges began discovering a few 
years ago that tuition aid to students, for example, was being used as a 
means of compelling them to comply with a variety of regulations that 
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would otherwise not apply. In a case involving Basic Educational 
Opportunity Grants (BEOGs), which are conditioned on a school's 
compliance with the sex discrimination guidelines of Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, the Court has recently seen fit to limit 
the impact of this stipulation to the specific program receiving the 
funds. As Justice White wrote in in Grove City College v. Bell, 104 
S.Ct. 1211 (1984): 
In defending its refusal to execute the Assurance of Compliance 
required by the Department's regulations, Grove City first contends 
that neither it nor any 'education program or activity' of the 
College receives any federal financial assistance within the 
meaning of Title IX by virtue of the fact that some of its students 
receive BEOGs and use them to pay for their education. We disagree 
(104 S.Ct. 1211, 1216). 
In a footnote, Justice White drew an analogy between what the college 
termed "indirect aid" and the coverage of local school districts that 
receive federal funds through state educational agencies. As a result 
of the decision, this Presbyterian college, which wants "to truly remain 
independent of government intervention," has decided to seek other means 
of funding student aid. 43 
Although this ruling probably falls more into the accommodationist 
than the separationist category, accommodation in this case means that 
aid is available to those schools that will comply with or accommodate 
themselves to the policy agenda of the state. In recent years, the 
state has become a major supplier or guarantor of loans and other aid. 
This gives it a commanding position in the market and an ability to 
regulate the supply as well to control access. 
But the conduits of regulation are many and varied. If there are 
any effective limits at all, they may be political rather than 
constitutional in nature. According to Stephen Pepper, only twice in 
its history--the Sherbert and Yoder cases--has the Court extended 
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First Amendment coverage on the sole basis of the free exercise clause 
by restricting a law considered religiously neutral on its face and in 
its intent. After the Court's ruling in the Lee case, in which an Amish 
employer who was himself exempt was required to pay social security 
taxes for his employees, Pepper concluded that the "first amendment 
doctrine protecting freedom of religious conduct is in significant 
disarray.n 44 
Now that tax exemptions are effectively being treated as subsidies 
rather than immunities, as may be concluded from the decision in Bob 
Jones University v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983), it is unclear 
whether independence of government intervention exists in more than a 
figurative sense. For example, the tax subsidy and charitable public 
trust concepts provided California with a rationale for requiring 
churches to forsake political activity. The fact that a church or a 
school has incorporated in order to limit their liability, hold property 
in perpetuity, and enjoy a tax-exempt status subjects it to corporate 
regulations that are entangling by their very nature. In the eyes of 
the law, only its legal alter ego--the religious corporation--exists. 
The communion of the saints has no standing before the bar. 
In addition to such voluntary entanglements, there are others that 
may be unavoidable. A sweeping view of the commerce clause, for 
example, opens up other regulatory possibilities that are arguably 
limited only by political realities or by the First Amendment in 
45 general. 
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R. Scott Tewes, who finds it difficult to justify revoking the tax 
exemptions of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian Schools 
under existing free exercise doctrines, has suggested two courses by 
which the neutrality principle may be upheld: 
Congress could legislate to revoke the tax exemptions along with 
those of all other nonprofit organizations. While it would make 
the schools subject to taxation, such action would do nothing to 
deter the racially based policies of the schools. Alternatively, 
under an extremely broad reading of the thirteenth amendment, 
Congress could prohibit all private discrimination. By defining 
discrimination in this manner, the act could prohibit the schools' 
racially based policies. This action, if valid, would stretch the 
thirteenth amendment to its limits for the purpose of outlawing the 
religiously motivated practice of a few religious groups. 
Accommodating the groups seems a small conc~5sion in exchange for 
continued religious and individual freedom. 
But it is such options as these and similar courses of action that 
have created the greatest consternation in the religious community. 
This is evident in the support given to the Bob Jones University's 
position by various religious organizations. 47 Although there is little 
general sympathy with racial classifications, churches are not unaware 
that even more sensitive categories are now, or in the future may be, 
subject to antidiscrimination laws. Under the regime of a state church, 
such direct intervention is to be expected. But under constitutional 
guarantees of religious liberty, the state must observe definite limits 
to the pursuit of its social as well as its fiscal and educational 
interests. Even where a compelling state interest is at stake, the 
Court has required that the least intrusive means of accomplishing it be 
used. Even so, in the absence of a definition of religious belief and 
conduct, such as that set out in the Davis test oath case, the free 
exercise guarantees are likely to continue to be subsumed under the 
establishment clause or other First Amendment provisions and their 
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applications will remain unpredictable. 
Cases and Controversies 
The crux of the rivalry between church and state--the bottom line 
for both of them--is, as always, who will determine the shape of things 
to come. The issue for churches often comes to the flashpoint when they 
are forced to defend standards of theological integrity that run 
directly counter to prevailing currents of thought in academia, in the 
chambers of government, or in the larger community. The state, on the 
other hand has an interest in maintaining public order and may see its 
interest to extend to exposing school children to a variety of 
experiences and influences that are thought to broaden their minds. 
There is much that may be said in favor of both views, but both cannot 
equally hope to prevail. 
The question of final authority cannot be evaded. After being 
charged with corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates was democratically 
tried, condemned, and given hemlock. Community standards prevailed. 
Yet history has been more kind to Socrates than to Athens. Likewise in 
the matter of educational standards today. For every accusation that 
parents and churches are corrupting the minds of young people, or 
censoring--even burning--books, there are similar accusations that 
schools are turning the hearts of children against their families, or 
that religious books are being censored. 48 When one person's literature 
is another person's religion, the controversy over censorship--to cite 
one among many problem areas--eventually deteriorates into a question of 
personal predilections, as the Supreme Court bears witness. 
State-mandated curricula and classroom reading selections invariably 
founder on the sort of perplexities that inspired Justice Potter 
Stewart's remark in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964) 
concerning "hard-core pornography" that, although he could not define 
it, "I know it when I see it ... " 
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Compulsory school attendance laws and federal aid to education have 
naturally bred a series of subsidiary requirements that are supposed to 
help determine whether proper educational and social standards are being 
met by all schools. Although some states, like Oregon, do not even 
require that private and home schools acknowledge their existence by 
registering with education office, the proliferation of grant programs 
has created a web of regulation that is increasingly difficult for a 
school of any appreciable size to escape. The possession of state 
approval and certified teachers is the secular equivalent of an 
imprimatur in the eyes of many of the families for whose patronage a 
private school must compete. In addition, states may offer attractive 
incentives--such as grant money, student aid, or special services--to 
induce schools to comply with their standards. For religious schools 
that are hard-pressed for money, such offerings may be difficult to 
resist and are potentially divisive. In Roemer v. Board of Public Works 
of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976), Justice John Paul Stevens voiced 
his concern over the "pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt 
religious schools to compromise their religious mission without wholly 
abandoning it." 49 It is a remarkable fact that schools begun by 
churches for religious purposes so often forsake their affiliation and 
become secularized. While it is not possible to attribute this tendency 
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to a single factor, undoubtedly incentives to conform to state 
guidelines and the financial realities of keeping a school competitive 
with state-subsidized schools have been factors in many cases. 
The winnowing process appears to particularly affect older, 
well-established institutions, especially those that have grown along 
fixed academic and budgetary lines. But it is with the small, often 
resource-poor fundamentalist schools that the greatest conflicts have 
been occurring. Not only are they often the least open to outside 
influence, they are also the most resilient in resisting what they 
regard as encroachments by the state. 
State regulations take a variety of forms. Accreditation of 
schools is one means of assuring that certain minimum standards will be 
met. While accrediting associations are nominally private agencies, 
they are usually dominated by tax-supported institutions and exercise 
quasi-governmental power. Oral Roberts University (ORU) pressed a 
complaint against the American Bar Association (ABA) after the ABA 
denied accreditation to the University's law school on the grounds that 
the law school's religion-based admissions and faculty hiring 
standards--along with its lack of salary parity with similar schools in 
the same geographical area--violated its rules. ORU objected that the 
ABA was using its monopoly power over law school accreditation in 
restraint of trade. The ABA changed the rule in 1981. 50 
Curriculum standards and teacher certification are other means of 
control. Three cases involving fundamentalist Christian schools were 
among the early causes celebres that aroused fundamentalist political 
activism. The first case was State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181 
(1976). At issue was the applicability of state-mandated curriculum 
standards to private religious schools. 51 Among the requirements at 
issue was the following: "' .. All activities shall conform to 
policies adopted by the board of education.' (The contention is 
advanced by appellants that this standard virtually provides a blank 
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check to the public authorities to control the entire operation of their 
52 
school.)" William Ball, who represented Pastor Levi Whisner of 
Bradford, Ohio, later reflected on the case: "In the Whisner case, 
certain religious institutions, as the price of their existence, were 
commanded to comply with provisions contained in a volume bearing the 
Aesopian title, 'Minimum Standards.' The book was 125 pages in length 
and contained some 600 'minimum standards.'" 53 When questioned during 
the trial, witnesses for the State admitted they did not expect full 
compliance but could not define what constituted "reasonable 
compliance." The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that these requirements 
substantially infringed on the religious liberties of the defendants, 
all of whom had been convicted of criminal failure to send their 
children to school. 
In Kentucky State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education v. 
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980), the 
Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the state's claim of authority to 
certify teachers in private schools and approve the textbooks. One of 
the expert witnesses for the appellees, Donald Erickson, commented: "The 
organizational structure of a school, in its formal and informal 
aspects, far from being a mere container into which ideas of many sorts 
can be poured, is itself a potent instrument, a 'hidden curriculum,' for 
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socializing children to particular lifestyle." 54 George Huntston 
Williams, a church historian, further stated: 
Education is an integral part of the mission of any church for its 
own people and for others as well .... I do not believe that the 
certification which is now mandated by the Legislature is itself 
entirely legitimate because these teachers in many cases are 
ministers. Surely the State would not have the right to interfere, 
to make judgment as to the qualifications of a minister. In fact, 
in these religious schools, the clergy are very frequently and 
prominently in the position also of teachers. This is the way it 
was in antiquity; this is the way it was in the 16th Century; this 
is the way it was in the beginning of our own school system in New 
England agg elsewhere in this country before we became a 
republic. 
Rousas John Rushdoony added a theological analysis: 
In fundamentalist religious teaching is required a strict adherence 
to Scripture. The State, according to Romans 13, is a ministry 
under God and a ministry of justice .... So that our offices of 
state are, to a fundamentalist, religious officers whether5gr not they have faith. They are accountable, therefore, to God. 
The Court cited the debates over the language of the original compulsory 
school attendance law in Kentucky and the Beckner amendment, which 
provided "that in the future there shall be no provision made requiring 
those who are conscientiously opposed to sending their children to 
public schools to do so." 57 Since that decision, the conflict has 
shifted to state approval or licensure to the schools themselves. 58 
The third case was State of North Carolina v. Columbus Christian 
Academy, No. 78-0VS-1678 (1979), which was made moot by a new law that 
excluded "nonpublic education from all education laws except those 
dealing with fire, safety, sanitation, and immunization." 59 The Academy 
had "challenged the state regulation of private schools in the areas of 
teacher certification, curriculum, length of school day and school year, 
health certification, and student inoculation." 60 
Direct licensure of church-affiliated schools has arisen as an 
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issue occasionally. In New Jersey State Board of Higher Education v. 
Board of Directors of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470 (1982), the New 
Jersey Supreme Co~rt issued a permanent injunction against the college, 
which is operated by Bible Presbyterian Church, restraining it from 
awarding credits or degrees without a license from the State Board of 
Higher Education. But mcst such litigation involves primary and 
secondary schools. Some states have held firm in their commitment to 
state approval, while others have been moving in the direction of the 
Whisner precedent. Though some states may yet appeal court rulings in 
61 favor of the church and home schools, others have conceded. 
The state that has stirred the most controversy over its school 
certification requirement is Nebraska, one of a handful of states that 
still apply fairly stringent approval standards for private schools. 
Nebraska schools are required by law to register with the state, employ 
as regular teachers only certified graduates of approved college 
teacher-training programs, observe mandatory curriculum standards, 
administer standardized tests, and provide a library containing at least 
a specified minimum number of books, no more than which a very small 
t b 1 - . . t d 62 percen age can e re lglon-orlen e . Some exceptions have been made 
and enforcement has been fairly selective in some parts of the state. 
But the Amish communities and fundamentalist churches have been the most 
visibly affected. By 1983, some twenty-two churches had joined together 
to oppose the law. 
The case that has received the most publicity involves Faith 
Baptist Church in Louisville. The pastor of the church, Rev. Everett 
Sileven, started a weekday school in the church basement in 1977. 
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Litigation began a few months later and culminated in an unfavorable 
ruling against the church in Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W. 
2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 75 (1981 ). But the school continued to 
operate. Shortly before classes were scheduled to open in the autumn of 
1982, the school was ordered closed by the sheriff. At one point, Rev. 
Sileven was arrested in the church sanctuary while meeting with the 
students and jailed for contempt of court. He eventually served out the 
full four-month sentence. When the school continued to meet, the church 
doors were padlocked between regular church services and protesting 
ministers were bodily removed by sheriff's officers. Some of the 
parents were charged with violating the truancy law. 
The case caught the attention of the national news media late in 
1983 wben seven fathers of the schoolchildren were jailed shortly before 
Thanksgiving and remained in jail for mere than three months. Their 
wives and children meanwhile had taken refuge across the state line. A 
panel was appointed by Governor Robert Kerrey to investigate the 
situation. Late in January the panel declared that the teacher 
certification procedures violated the free exercise rights of Christian 
schools and recommended that church schools be exempted. Following 
several attempts, legislation to relieve the churches was finally passed 
in March. The new law is scheduled to take effect in July. But Rev. 
Sileven was arrested and jailed again upon returning to the state late 
in April of 1984. As of this writing, the issues still await a full 
l t . 63 reso u lon. Similar incidents have taken place in Lincoln, York, 
North Platte, and Grand Island, including cumulative fines at one school 
and the search and seizure of school files at another. 64 
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Federal regulations have also been a source of friction. On August 
21, 1978, IRS announced a "Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private 
Tax-Exempt Schools" designed to determine whether private schools have 
racially discriminatory policies that disqualified them for tax 
exemption. This aroused considerable opposition from religious groups 
throughout the country and IRS received approximately 125,000 letters of 
protest. ~!hen hearings were held late that autumn, state and local 
leaders from almost every state testified against the procedure. Nearly 
120 members of Congress were included in the state delegations. For 
several years afterwards, the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments were 
attached to appropriations bills to prevent enforcement of the 
65 procedure. 
The proliferation of Christian day schools in recent years, which 
James Carper has termed "the first widespread secession from the public 
school pattern since the establishment of the Catholic schocls in the 
66 
nineteenth century," has also been broadening in scope through the 
home school movement. It may be expected that much of the new legal 
ground here will be broken by litigation over home schools in coming 
years. Here the appeal is not to the free exercise rights of 
church-related ministries but the rights of parents and families, 
whether or not these are understood in terms of religious conviction. 
Historically speaking, home education enjoyed priority in the American 
colonies and during much of the nineteenth century. E. Alice Law 
Beshoner commented on the nature of the transition to public education: 
The state assumed the role of aiding the parents in the task of 
preparing their offspring for adulthood by providing 
state-supported "free" schools to which the parents could, if they 
chose, delegate some portion, or all, of this parental 
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responsibility. Thus, the important issue in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was not whether the state could compel school 
attendance, but wtether or not parents could demand that the state 
aid them in their duty at public expense. The issue was resolved 
in favor of the parental demand and resulted in the rise of large 
tax-supported systems of elementary schools in the North. Although 
viewed as an "aid" to the parent, the establishment of public 
education in the North, and, after the Civil War, in the South, had 
the ultimate effec57of eroding the common law parental right over a child's education. 
As Charles Burgess has noted, the reassertion of the old Roman law 
doctrine of parens patriae--which had earlier been used by the state to 
take custody of infants whose persons or property had been violated--and 
the extension of its concept of infancy well into the teenage years were 
contributing to this ersoion of parental rights by the turn of the 
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century. 
Although it is too early to predict how the courts ,will divide the 
issues in the growing controversy over home education, the argument is 
being made in some circles that the state lacks a compelling interest in 
requiring certification of teachers and equivalency of curriculum if can 
not even demonstrate a correlation between compliance with these 
standards and the educational achievement of students. 69 At one point, 
the compulsory school attendance law of North Carolina, which had been 
modified to accommodate the objections of Christian schools, was ruled 
unconstitutional by a federal district court because of its lack of 
equity as applied to home education: "If the state makes no attempt to 
maintain minimal educational standards in nonpublic schools, its 
requirement that a school be attended is little more than empty 
coercion, particularly when those children are in fact being relatively 
1t1ell educated at home." 70 The state's interest in the education of 
school age children, including its authority to set minimum standards, 
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has been consistently upheld in the courts, but the ccnstitutional 
boundaries of its interest and authority are being tested in great 
detail. Litigation is being used to establish precedents and each side 
seeks test cases in which it can work from a position of strength. But 
as has often been said, "hard cases" establish bad precedents. 71 
Particular regulations are vulnerable to challenge unless a 
compelling state interest can be shown and unless the least restrictive 
means of enforcing that interest are used. A "clear and compelling 
proof" standard of evidence, as opposed to a preponderance of the 
evidence standard or a balancing test, has been suggested by some 
critics as the best way to secure the preferential position of religious 
liberty. 72 The proliferation of new varieties of nonpublic schools has 
resulted in numerous gradations between traditional church schools and 
home schools. Resolution of the competing interests between curriculum 
standards, compulsory school attendance requirements, parental choice, 
and religious liberty is likely to eventually require policies that 
apply to all nonpublic school alternatives equally. Thus issues of 
religious liberty for church schools and parental choice appear to be 
inseparably linked in the larger context of civil liberty. 
Despite the increasing proportion of litigation involving nonpublic 
schools, public education controversies, where the free exercise and 
establishment ccncerns wEre first raised, have not disappeared. Old 
battles over school prayer, Bible reading, and released time for 
religious classes have been supplemented by others, such as the teaching 
of the creation account of origins, the distribution of religious 
literature on campus, and the holding of religious meetings by students. 
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Two decades after the Supreme Court's Engel and Schempp rulings 
agEinst prayer and Bible reading, faculty members, elected officials, 
and school boards continue to ignore or actively resist the letter and 
spirit of these rulings. In Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 
1981 ), affirmed, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), a federal court struck down a 
Louisiana policy permitting classroom teachers to ask whether any 
interested student would like to offer a prayer at the start of the 
school day. In Collins v. Chandler Unified School District, 644 F.2d 
759 (9th Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981 ), another federal 
court ruled that permission may not be granted to a student council 
re~uest to choose members of the student body to open each school 
assembly with a prayer. 
The issues persist not simply out of habit or defiance but very 
often because of the strong religious significance attached to public 
gatherings. The word church or congregation originally meant a public 
assembly for worship. Public meetings were traditionally opened with 
prayer, a custom which persists--despite its religious origins--in state 
legislative assemblies and Congress today. While the religious content 
of particular customs--like civil ceremonies and holidays--may change, 
their significance as religious exercises appear to be widely understood 
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and accepted. Similarly, there is little doubt about the religious 
origin and significance of Sunday closing laws despite the Supreme 
Court's ruling in the McGowan case that they had evolved into a secular 
and religiously neutral designation of a public day of rest. The 
official purpose attributed to sabbath laws is often less significant to 
supporters than the fact of their continued observance. 
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The issues have raised civil religious otservances occasionally 
provoked spirited dissents from the federal bench. Justice Brennan's 
dissent in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983), made clear that he 
did not regard historic precedent for the opening of a legislative 
session with prayer by a paid chaplain--as a defense against its 
unconstitutionality as an establishment of religion. Justice Douglas 
had earlier hinted much the same thing in his Engel concurrence. The 
problem here is the ambiguous meaning of the First Amendment language as 
applied by the Fourteenth Amendment. The wording of the two 
clauses--"respecting an establishment" and "prohibiting the free 
exercise"--is not directly parallel. The Supreme Court, however, has 
construed them as parallel restraints and has given them equal weight in 
application. This may be a source of the tension or conflict that 
allegedly exists bet~tJeen the tvm clauses. Consequently, their 
respective claims are sometimes balanced. But disagreements have 
persisted and the high level of litigation is one indication of both the 
lack of public consensus and the strength of continuing oppositions to 
separate religion from public life. 
One example of this lack of public consensus is the school prayer 
issue. Since the Engels and Schempp decisions of two decades ago, bills 
have been repeatedly introduced and sometimes debated on the floor of 
Congress. Despite its symbolic importance, it reflects a conscious 
association of religion and education in the minds of m&ny people. For 
this reason, it is likely to remain a matter of continuing interest 
despite uncertainties about the place of religion, if any, in the public 
school classroom. O~e Vermont teacher, Peter Huidekoper, believes that 
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school prayer or a moment of silence is not the issue: 
It is not the moment of silence, then, that concerns us most. It 
is a whole school day of silence about God, an attitude that 
restricts and endangers truly free inquiry and open discussion 
about matters if they happen to take on a religious nature. It is 
this silence, this attitude, that concerns us very deeply .... We 
must return to a teacher's essential task: to stretch the 
imagination. And we must remember that we diminish the 
intellectual and spiritual growth of our students when we succumb 
to the current absurdity that simply to speak of God 94 religious 
values and beliefs is--Lord help us--against the law. 
A recent opinion by a federal judge in a school prayer case, 
Jaffree v. James, 544 F.Supp. 727, 732 (1982), which challenged what he 
called "judicial fiat," held: 
The case law, in the opinion of the Court, has overlooked the 
totality of what is religion in its consideration when deciding 
issues under the establishment clause of the Constitution. The 
background of this country and its laws is one based upon the 
Judea-Christian ethic. It is apparent from a reading of the 
decision law that the Courts acknowledge that Christianity is the 
religion to be proscribed .... The religions of atheism, 
materialism, agnosticism, communism and socialism have escaped the 
scrutiny of the courts throughout the years, and make no mistake 
these are to the believers religions; they are ardently adhered to 
and quantitatively advanced in the teachings and literature that is 
presented to the fertile minds of the students in the various 
school systems. If the courts are to involve themselves in the 
proscription of religious activities in the schools, then it 
appears to this Court that we are going to have to involve 
ourselves in a whole host of areas, such as censorship, that we 
have theretofore ignored or overlooked. 
In Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 103 S.Ct. 842 (1983), 
Justice Powell reinstated an injunction against school prayers in 
Alabama and the Supreme Court rejected the school prayer law in Wallace 
v~ Jaffree, 104 S.Ct. 1704 (1984). But Judge W. Brevard Hand's earlier 
dismissal of the suit in Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 554 
F.Supp. 1104 (1983), evoked memories of an older custom, interposition, 
which likewise had religious origins, particularly in the Calvinist view 
that lesser magistrates may interpose their authority when a higher 
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magistrate errs. 75 
In a number of recent controversies, conflicting precedents have 
been set by the federal courts, adding further confusion. For example, 
a student-sponsored prayer group in one public school was ruled 
unconstitutional in Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent 
School District, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), but a similar prayer 
group in another public school was upheld under free speech protections 
in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 563 F.Supp. 697 (M.D.Pa. 
1983). One indication of a possible favorable ruling in these cases by 
the Supreme Court is that it upheld such meetings on a state university 
campus in the Widmar case, ruling that students must be allowed equal 
access to public forums for religious functions. But the Court has 
usually shown itself more favorably disposed toward liberal standards at 
the college level because of the comparative maturity of the students. 
An attempt by Congress to address the issue failed in May of 1984. 
Another area of controversy that has received considerable 
attention in the press from time to time is the teaching of evolution 
or, alternatively, the teaching of creation in public school classrooms. 
The Scopes trial of 1925 in Tennessee, which was one of the memorable 
events of that period, culminated decades of what Andrew Dickson White 
termed "the warfare of science with theology." But it was not until the 
Epperson case in 1968 that the Court struck down a law prohibiting the 
teaching of evolution in public schools. Mississippi was the last state 
to repeal a similar law in 1972. 
Attention has lately shifted to state laws requiring equal time for 
creation or a balanced treatment of evolution and creation as theories 
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of origins. Some states, like Oregon, have taken a permissive position 
on the question, allowing local school districts the option of including 
or excluding the teaching of creation along with evolution in biology 
classes. But a federal court ruled against an Arkansas statute 
requiring balanced treatment in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 
529 F.Supp. 125 (E.D.Ark. 1982). More recently, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court has upheld a similar law in that state. 76 Advocates of 
"scientific creationism" contend they are able to avoid overt religious 
teaching by confining their endeavors to considering scientific 
evidences for creation. Opponents claim the issue is not a scientific 
question at all but strictly a religious one. Whatever the merits of 
the particular arguments for or against the teaching of creation 
alongside evolution in public schools, the exclusive teaching of 
evolution as a theory of origins clearly raises serious questions about 
the possibility of religious neutrality in the classroom where an 
established scientific or ideological orthodoxy competes to a greater or 
lesser degree with a traditional religious orthodoxy. 77 
Families that hold clear convictions concerning textbooks have 
typically been responding by withdrawing from the public school system. 
Along with the lack of religious teaching, dissatisfaction over the 
curriculum and textbooks have been among the many factors which have 
strenthened the Christian school movement in recent years. In this 
respect, the current issues and responses are not materially different 
from the reaction of Catholic families in the nineteenth century to 
what they regarded as the teaching of Protestant values in public 
schools. They may or may not have been mistaken about the purpose of 
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the public schools but these families judged them by their fruits. 
Conclusions 
The innumerable conflicts that have arisen over the setting of the 
educational agenda are unlikely to be resolved through legislation or 
adjudication by the courts. The persistence of many issues reflects 
real--perhaps growing--divisions over the place of the family, church 
and state in community life. As symptoms of cultural disintegration and 
reorientation they might best be regarded as warning signals rather than 
political problems that have direct or immediate solutions. When 
confronted by two women who claimed the same infant, King Solomon did 
not solve the problem by dividing the child between them. He wisely 
avoided the obvious dilemma by judging their motives and convictions. 
The interests of the state in fostering education have been clearly 
asserted from the earliest period of American history. Common schools 
were publicly supported in many parts of New England as early as the 
1640s. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 set aside public land for the 
support of schools in ther federal territories. Thus public aid for 
education has been the earliest expression of the state's interest. 
After the late 1830s, the public school movement and, later, compulsory 
school attendance laws began to spread across the country. Parochial 
school systems developed in response to the perceived religious bias of 
the tax-supported schools. In more recent years, the Christian school 
movement has grown in response to the secularization of public schools. 
Considerable controversy is centered on religious activities in public 
schools and the availability of public funds for nonpublic schools. The 
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jurisdictional boundaries between family, church, and state are not 
clearly drawn in current law, which has had the result of making it 
difficult to sort out competing interests and bringing them into 
constitutional harmony. This as increasingly become a matter left to 
the arbitration of the courts, perhaps in part by default, at a time of 
rapid cultural change. 
But the recognition of education as a ministry of the church is 
again gaining increasing acceptance in otherwise disparate religious 
circles. 78 The extent and limits of the state's interest in regulating 
church and home schools have consequently become subjects of political 
controversy. Some churches and families see the issue as unfriendly 
political interference, while some public educators regard the issue as 
one of preserving school systems as enrollments decline and the portion 
of families with children in public schools declines. Many regulations 
are suspected of deliberately making private schools less competitive 
with public schools by establishing mandatory standards that tend to 
either dilute essential differences in the educational product or raise 
the operating costs of the schools. The burdens, however, tend to be 
inhibitory rather than prohibitory. Few states have adopted regulations 
that clearly restrict religious liberty. 
Thomas Vitullo-Martin notes that ''the potential for powerful 
control of private schools is not yet developed. The enforcement 
of state regulations on private schools is not highly directive. 1179 But 
the lobbying on all sides of various educational issues, like tuition 
tax credits and lower school attendance age requirements, has been 
intense in recent years. Tuition tax credits have been described by the 
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National Education Association as a vehicle for creating an educational 
caste system because of the exclusivity of nonpublic schools. The 
American Civil Liberties Union has similarly complained about credits 
80 because of the lack of regulation of private schools by the state. 
Whether or not tuition tax credits or education vouchers ever generally 
prevail, supporters would do well to consider their potential for 
entanglements and a resultant demand for greater regulation of private 
education. Wisdom dictates avoiding unnecessary dilemmas. 
Seen purely as a problem in political pragmatics, the protection of 
religious liberty in private and public education requires that at a 
minimum the close tie between tax-support for schools and compulsory 
school attendance laws be weakened or severed. One proposal is to end 
the state establishment of schools in favor of competitive private 
school systems. While this is the goal of libertarians like Murray 
81 Rothbard and Joel Spring, it is gaining support from other quarters. 
Another possibility would be to require some level of tuition to be 
paid by all families, not just those that reside outside the district. 
But neither course is likely anytime soon unless economic conditions or 
public attitudes radically change. Rockne McCarthy, James Skillen, and 
William Harper believe that there must be a redefinition of public 
responsibility for education along with greater recognition given to 
82 parental responsibility and a redesign of public funding procedures. 
Stephen Arons believes that any solution requires at least the following 
elements: 
First, a state's school-financing system may not condition the 
provision of free education upon the sacrifice of First Amendment 
rights. Second, a state may not, consistently with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, permit educational 
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choice for affluent parents while inhibiting it for poor parents. 
Third, state regulation of private schools may not substantially 
affect value inculcation within tg3m unless there is a compelling 
state justification for doing so. 
In the meantime, religious liberty is being defended in some 
quarters as a constitutional right that is second to none. This carries 
a risk that the judicial balance may be tipped toward license on the 
part of some avowedly religious organizations, as the Ballard, Saia, and 
Terminiello decisions arguably did in the past. But while deterrence is 
a legitimate public expectation when respect for law rules, the 
reconstitution of law requires first of all a citizenry willing to take 
responsibility for assuring public justice. It is here that the 
interests of religion and politics must converge if free institutions 
are to be maintained. 
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